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Abstract 
We systematically analyze the role of social comparison processes in organizations. Specifically, 
we describe how social comparison processes have been used to explain six key areas of 
organizational inquiry: (1) organizational justice, (2) performance appraisal, (3) virtual work 
environments, (4) affective behavior in the workplace, (5) stress, and (6) leadership. 
Additionally, we describe how unique contextual factors in organizations offer new insight into 
two widely-studied sub-processes of social comparison, acquiring social information and 
thinking about that information. Our analyses underscore the merit of integrating organizational 
phenomena and social comparison processes in future research and theory. 
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I’m bored to extinction with Harrison. 
His limericks and puns are embarrassing. 
But I’m fond of the bum, 
For, though dull as they come, 
He makes me feel bright by comparison. 
Anonymous 
What this poet (sic) apparently lacks in expressive talent appears to be eclipsed, at least 
somewhat, by his or her keen insight into human social behavior. That people acquire personal 
insight by comparing themselves to others goes beyond the stuff of lame lyrical lucidity. Indeed, 
social scientists know a great deal about the processes governing people’s comparisons with one 
another—so-called, social comparisons. For this, we are indebted to Festinger (1954), whose 
influential theory of social comparison introduced over a half century ago subsequently gave rise 
to more refined conceptual developments (e.g., Mussweiler, 2003; Wood, 1989, 1996), resulting 
in a massive contemporary literature on social comparison processes (e.g., Suls & Wheeler, 
2000). As chronicled by the insightful contributions to the present issue of this journal by Moore 
(2007) and by Buunk and Gibbons (2007), research has shed considerable light on the general 
processes by which people compare themselves to others in the course of everyday social 
interaction (Wheeler & Miyake, 1992). 
A highlight of this literature has been its capacity to explain social behavior in a variety 
of specific situations and contexts, such as judging health and illness (e.g., Tennen, McKee, & 
Affleck, 2000), gossiping with others (e.g., Wert & Salovey, 2004), and performing family 
chores (Grote, Naylor, & Clark, 2002). In view of this, we find it curious that social scientists 
have not made more extensive use of work on social comparison processes in studying behavior 
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in one of the most popular settings for investigating human behavior, the workplace (for some 
exceptions, see Goodman, 1977; Steil & Hay, 1997; Tenbrunsel & Diekmann, 2002; Van 
Yperen, 1992). Our reaction is predicated on the observation that social comparison appears to 
be embedded deeply into the fabric of organizational life. For example, social comparison occurs 
in both planned activities, such as when supervisors evaluate subordinates’ performance relative 
to others (Mumford, 1983), and on naturally occurring occasions, such as when employees 
discover by happenstance how their own pay compares to that of others (Bylsma & Major, 
1994). 
Despite these connections, we are aware of no unified efforts to explain organizational 
behavior from the perspective of social comparison processes. As we suggest here, however, 
such an endeavor may prove worthwhile—both insofar as it promises to shed light on our 
understanding of various forms of workplace behavior and on social comparison processes 
themselves. With this in mind, we undertake such an analysis in the present article. Specifically, 
we review various workplace practices and processes into which insight has been provided by 
application of social comparison processes. In this respect, although social comparison processes 
are embedded in most social interactions, we have identified six particular topics of interest to 
organizational psychologists that are especially germane: (1) organizational justice, 
(2) performance appraisal, (3) virtual work environments, and (4) affective behavior in the 
workplace, (5) stress, and (6) leadership. All of these topics continue to attract active research 
interest in I/O psychology, and involve social comparisons at varying levels. Connections 
between these topics and social comparison processes range from well-researched 
interrelationships (as in the case of organizational justice) to sets of logically derived 
propositions (as in the case of virtual work environments). At the end of each section, we provide 
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a brief summary of the key conclusions that flow from our analyses. Finally, after analyzing 
these connections, we conclude with an overall assessment of the unique insight into various 
sub-processes of social comparison derived from examining them in organizations. 
Organizational Justice 
In his novel, Woman in Love, British author, D. H. Lawrence (1921) commented that, 
“One man isn’t any better than another, not because they are equal, but because…there is no 
term of comparison” (p. 247). This observation squares with the widely accepted social scientific 
dictum that when people judge how fairly they are treated they take into account the manner in 
which others are treated (Cohen, 1986). This is applicable to all three forms of organizational 
justice (for a review, see Colquitt, Greenberg, & Zapata-Phelan, 2005)—distributive justice (the 
perceived fairness of the distribution of outcomes), procedural justice (the perceive fairness of 
the procedures used to determine those outcomes) and interactional justice (the perceived 
fairness of the interpersonal treatment used to explain procedures and outcomes). 
Distributive Justice 
The comparative nature of justice is fundamental to distributive justice as articulated in 
Adams’s (1965) equity theory. This is not surprising given that equity theory is predicated on 
Festinger’s (1957) cognitive dissonance theory, Thibaut and Kelley’s (1959) exchange theory, 
and Homans’s (1961) theory of distributive justice—three conceptualizations in which social 
comparison processes feature prominently. Specifically, Adams (1965) stipulates that for a state 
of equity to be perceived as existing between two parties, they must receive some normatively 
appropriate rate of return in a social exchange. This is defined in terms of the ratio of benefits 
one receives (i.e., outcomes) relative to the contributions one has made (i.e., inputs) as compared 
to the corresponding ratio of some referent other. With respect to the exact nature of this “other,” 
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equity theory fails to specify either the precise nature and form of these comparison standards or 
when they are used—an omission that Adams later would admit to being a limitation of his 
theory (Adams & Freedman, 1976). 
Acknowledging the fundamental nature of social comparison in promoting justice, 
various theorists have considered the comparative nature of fairness assessments in their own 
analyses of equity (e.g., Austin, 1977). Indeed, research has shown that equity judgments are 
based more strongly on social comparisons than on general expectations (Austin, McGinn, & 
Susmilch, 1980). In addition, people tend to place considerable weight on social comparisons, 
even when they have objective information suggesting that they are doing “better than average” 
(Seta, Seta, & McElroy, 2006).  In the workplace, moreover, where comparative information 
generally is available, it is recognized that judgments of fairness stem from several referent 
sources (for a summary, see Table 1), although most of the research and theorizing focuses on 
two categories—internal comparisons and external comparisons. 
Table 1 
Reference Standards Commonly Used in Making Equity Judgments 
Reference standard Primary sources 
 
Other individuals within one’s own 
organization 
 
 
Adams (1965), Walster, Walster & Berscheid 
(1978) 
External references, such as industry 
standards 
Zelditch, Berger, Anderson, & Cohen (1970), 
Jasso (1980) 
 
Oneself at an earlier point in time Adams (1965), Goodman (1974) 
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Other people in general; transrelational 
equity, or equity with the world 
 
Austin & Walster (1975) 
Beliefs about others’ opinions of 
oneself 
 
Folger & Kass (2000)  
 
Internal comparisons. Equity judgments may be based on comparisons between one’s 
own outcomes and inputs relative to those of relevant others in one’s organization, such as 
coworkers, with whom one is in a relationship. This is the so-called “person-other” comparison 
typically examined by social psychologists (e.g., Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978), also 
referred to as assessments of “internal equity” by human resources specialists (e.g., Milkovich & 
Newman, 2004). Specifically, equity theory notes only that the “reference person or group…[is] 
comparable to the comparer on one or more attributes” (Adams, 1965, p. 280). Austin (1977) 
suggested that these attributes include factors such as proximity (e.g., “local” comparisons, such 
as to coworkers, made on the basis of propinquity), similarity (e.g., on such dimensions as 
organizational status) and instrumentality (i.e., interest in cultivating certain impressions of 
oneself)—all of which also have been the focus of studies by social comparison theorists (e.g., 
Wood, 1989). 
Indeed, research has shown that people whose ratios of outcomes/inputs are unequal to 
the comparable ratios of referent others perceive this state of affairs to be inequitable (for a 
review, see Greenberg, 1982). However, the degree to which such imbalances are perceived to be 
inequitable is determined by the perceived self-relevance of the comparison target (Martin, 
1981). For example, although women as a whole are paid less than men for doing comparable 
Preprint version 
Later published as Social comparison processes in organizations. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 102, 22-41. 
work, they tend not to be dissatisfied with their pay because they generally compare themselves 
not to men but to other women (Crosby, 1984). 
Recent research also has shown that social comparisons with respect to pay for work 
done also occur outside the traditional workplace, specifically the division of family work. In this 
case, however, because one’s spouse is a more salient and available source of comparison than 
other same-sex individuals in general, cross-gender comparisons are salient (Buunk & Van 
Yperen, 1991). In this regard, Grote, Naylor, and Clark (2002) found that when assessing the 
fairness of the division of family work, women were more likely to compare themselves to their 
spouses than to women in other families, and that doing so led them to believe that their current 
arrangements were lopsided and unfair to themselves. Such findings illustrate the tendency for 
people to select different referent others under different situations and that in so doing, they 
arrive at different conclusions about the fairness of their work arrangements. Supplementing 
these situational findings, research also has found reliable individual differences in the ways in 
which social comparisons determine reactions to relative deprivation—the so-called social 
comparison orientation (Buunk & Gibbons, 2007; Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). 
External comparisons. Equity judgments also may be based on comparisons with external 
standards—others, either known specifically or generalized, who are outside one’s organization. 
Although social psychologists acknowledge this possibility (e.g., Walster et al., 1972), 
sociologists have embraced it and developed it further by noting that local comparisons alone are 
insufficient to promote feelings of inequity (Zelditch, Berger, Anderson, & Cohen, 1970) and 
that employees work within a “referential structure” that defines their expectations of fairness 
(Jasso, 1980). Indeed, these external referents have been found to be more predictive of 
perceptions of inequity than local, person-to-person comparisons (Singh, 1994). 
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This is reassuring given that external referents in the form of published industry standards 
are used widely by labor economists as the basis for determining equitable wages in many 
occupations (e.g., Michael, Hartmann, O’Farrell, 1989; Simkin, 2005). Research in this tradition 
(for a review, see Wallace, Leicht, & Raffalovich, 1999) has found that people paid lower than 
prevailing industry-wide wages for the work they do believe that they are unfairly paid and such 
individuals are inclined to organize collective action (e.g., strikes and work stoppages) against 
their employers. By contrast, workers who either lack such external information or who 
disregard it tend to feel less aggrieved because the source of invidious comparison is absent. As a 
result, they are disinclined to take such extreme action. 
To date, although internal and external comparison standards have received the greatest 
attention among theorists, additional referent standards also have been identified (several of 
which are listed in Table 1). The proliferation of attention to comparison standards used in 
assessing equity has revealed more about the particular standards that might be used than which 
particular ones actually are used under various circumstances. Although we find Davis’s (1959) 
characterization of the choice of comparison other as “random” (p. 281) to be too fatalistic for 
our taste, we surely agree with Allen’s quarter-century-old depiction that this is “an obstinate 
problem” (Allen, 1982, p. 196). 
Procedural Justice Comparisons 
Allen’s (1982) characterization was meant to describe the role of comparison standards in 
assessments of distributive justice (i.e., the perceived fairness of the allocation of resources), but 
it is applicable as well to knowledge of the role of comparison standards on assessments of 
procedural justice (i.e., the perceived fairness of the procedures on which those allocation 
decisions are made). Going beyond equity theory, Folger’s (1986a, 1986b) referent cognitions 
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theory (RCT) explicitly acknowledges the role of reference comparisons in assessments of 
fairness. Specifically, RCT claims that when people reflect on events and outcomes they 
generate mental simulations, known as referent cognitions, comparing what could have happened 
to what actually happened. Research has found that people feel treated unfairly when they or 
another would have received more favorable outcomes had a fairer procedure been used (Folger 
& Cropanzano, 1998), such as one that grants the individual voice or that is based on information 
believed to be valid. This feature of RCT is key insofar as it specifies that it is not only 
procedures affecting oneself that serve as a frame of reference in assessing fairness, but also 
procedures affecting others. 
We see this, for example, in research by Ambrose and Kulik (1989; Ambrose, Harland, & 
Kulik, 1991) showing that people rely on the procedures used with their coworkers to assess the 
fairness of the systems in which they, themselves are operating. Grienberger, Rutte, and Van 
Knippenberg (1997) shed light on this in a laboratory study in which they manipulated 
information about the fairness of the procedures used to determine the rewards received by 
themselves and a coworker. Specifically, they found that the most unfair procedures were 
believed to be those in which participants were denied control over the procedures used to 
determine outcomes although their coworkers were granted such control (for an overview of 
related evidence, see Conquitt, Zapata-Phelan, & Roberson, 2005). Interestingly, Grienberger et 
al. (1997) also found that procedures that gave participants control themselves but that denied 
control to their coworkers were not perceived to be unfair. These findings suggest that people 
make comparisons between the procedures that affect themselves and others, but that this 
information is processed in a self-serving manner (Greenberg, 1983; Rutte & Messick, 1995). 
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Thus, in addition to relatively unfavorable outcomes, it is clear that relatively unfavorable 
procedures also promote feelings of injustice. 
Interactional Justice Comparisons 
How do people rely on social comparisons when making judgments about interactional 
justice? What we know, although limited in scope, is straightforward in nature. Specifically, 
research has shown that workers rely on consensual information from their coworkers when 
forming impressions of interactional justice (Lamertz 2002), especially knowledge of the 
injustices those individuals have suffered (Kray & Lind, 2002). Given the inherent vagaries 
about what constitutes appropriate levels of dignity and respect in the treatment of individuals in 
the workplace, reliance on social comparison information in making such judgments is not 
unexpected (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998). In fact, it has been demonstrated that people are so 
highly sensitive to violations of interactional justice in judging reactions to others that such 
perceptions override people’s concerns about one’s own relatively unfair share of outcomes 
(Collie, Bradley, & Sparks, 2002). 
This research sets the stage for a more specific question about the role of social 
comparison processes in interactional justice. The research noted earlier in this section of the 
chapter has shown that people judging fairness make social comparisons regarding outcomes and 
procedures. However, do they also compare themselves to others with respect to interactional 
justice—that is, the way they are treated compared to others? How do people respond to 
receiving higher or lower amounts of information than relevant others? 
Preliminary findings suggest that their reactions are quite dramatic. Specifically, in a 
role-playing study Greenberg (2006) found that the only condition under which people found it 
justifiable to strike-back at a supervisor who has treated him or her unfairly was when a 
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distributive injustice (i.e., relatively low outcomes) to himself or herself was explained in an 
uncaring and insensitive manner whereas an analogous injustice was explained to another in a 
manner demonstrating higher levels of interactional justice. In other words, people are highly 
sensitive to being denied sensitive and caring treatment at the hands of another who has 
demonstrated the capacity to behave in this manner. However, workers responded less negatively 
to supervisors who showed themselves to be equally insensitive to others (i.e., “equal-
opportunity jerks”). Apparently, it is not only the lack of sensitivity received that matters, but the 
decision to withhold that interpersonal benefit by someone who is capable of bestowing it (i.e., 
discriminatory behavior). And this, of course, is made possible by the use of social comparisons. 
Key Conclusions: Organizational Justice 
It is clear that assessments of fairness on the job are comparative in nature from 
distributive, procedural, and interactional perspectives. People judging what is fair compare the 
outcomes they receive to the outcomes others receive. But, this is not all. They also judge 
fairness by comparing themselves to others in two additional ways—the procedures by which 
they and others obtain rewards, and the manner in which they and others are treated in the course 
of enacting those procedures. Thus, the salient question in assessing fairness appears to be, 
“Compared to what?” And the answer, as we have noted, takes distributive, procedural, and 
interactional forms. In this connection, we believe that organizational justice is a potentially 
fruitful area in which to develop further the role of social comparison processes in organizational 
settings.  
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Performance Appraisal 
The process of formally appraising job performance is a well-established managerial 
function (Grote, 1996), a key purpose of which is to provide feedback useful to improving 
subsequent performance (Brett & Atwater, 2001; Tziner, Murphy, & Cleveland, 2005). Unless 
that feedback is accepted, however, this benefit is unlikely to accrue (Kluger & DeNisi, 1996). 
And, it has been shown that employees’ acceptance of performance evaluations depend in large 
part on their beliefs about reliance on the use of appropriate information by supervisors 
(Greenberg, 1986c). Performance assessments based on characteristics believed to be related to 
job performance legitimately are better accepted by employees as bases for making performance 
judgments than characteristics whose appropriateness is questionable (Greenberg, 1986a, 1986b). 
As a result, such legitimate information is likely to be useful in fulfilling a key objective of the 
performance appraisal process. 
Given people’s complex and frequently biased reactions to performance evaluations, 
however, legitimate performance information may come to be rejected. We describe two 
processes that are likely to threaten the performance appraisal process by interfering with 
acceptance of critical information. The first, to which we refer as the rejection problem, refers to 
the tendency to give little consideration to such information; the second, to which we refer as the 
deflection problem, refers to the tendency to reconstruct the situation cognitively so as to 
discount that information. Both of these performance appraisal problems, as we will see, involve 
the social comparison process. 
The Rejection Problem 
Sometimes, people fail to accept what appear to be clearly legitimate bases for making 
performance judgments (e.g., possession of task-relevant skills), thereby threatening the validity 
and utility of the appraisal process. Research and theory on the proxy model of social 
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comparison (Martin, 2000; Wheeler, Martin, & Suls, 1997) offers insight into why workers reject 
seemingly valid information. Specifically, this conceptualization claims that people engage in 
social comparisons to gather information about their probability of success on new, future tasks 
with which they are unfamiliar. To avoid failure in such situations, people ask themselves, “Can 
I perform this new task?” In answering, people compare themselves to other individuals (i.e., 
proxies) who already are performing that task, but only when two conditions prevail: (1) if the 
proxy’s performance on the initial task is perceived to be similar to one’s own performance, and 
(2) if the proxy is believed to have exerted a considerable amount of effort on that initial task. 
For illustrative purposes, let’s consider a simple situation that’s likely to occur in the 
workplace. Suppose, for example, that Kaylene is a bank teller who is considering a new position 
as assistant branch manager. Because failure in that new post likely would affect Kaylene’s job 
security and reputation adversely, she is likely to ask herself, “Can I perform the new job?” 
before accepting the new position. Applying the proxy model, Kaylene would compare herself to 
a current assistant manager who she believes once performed equally well as a teller—but only 
so long as that individual also was believed to have worked very hard at that job. That assistant 
manager would be considered sufficiently similar to oneself to serve as a valid, diagnostic basis 
of comparison—hence, a proxy for Kaylene to use in gauging her own likely performance. By 
contrast, in judging her likelihood of success, Kaylene would not compare herself to another 
assistant manager whose performance as a teller she believes is different than hers and/or one 
whose effort as a teller either she believes is lower than hers or that is unknown to her. 
The proxy model asserts further that when people know a proxy’s initial level of effort, 
they will consider related attributes irrelevant to task performance and therefore will disregard 
them when making judgments about potential performance. By contrast, people will consider 
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these same attributes to be diagnostic of future performance when lacking information about the 
proxy’s effort. Martin, Suls, and Wheeler (2002) demonstrated this in research in which several 
different performance tasks were involved. One of these was a grip-strength task. When 
participants had no information about another’s efforts on this task they predicted their own 
performance based largely on information about attributes of this individual that were similar to 
themselves. For example, if participants’ hand sizes matched those of a successful individual 
they expected to perform equally well, but if their own hands were smaller they expected to do 
worse. Thus, participants judged their own future performance based on how their own relevant 
characteristics compared to those of the comparison other. By contrast, relative hand size had no 
bearing on the judgments of participants who believed the proxy invested a great deal of effort in 
the task. These individuals expected to perform as well as the proxy regardless of their own hand 
size. 
Such evidence, together with the theory upon which it rests, suggests that workers may 
reject what appear to be valid determinants of their task performance (hence, “the rejection 
problem”). Should this occur in an organization, workers would be disinclined to accept efforts 
to train them in key skills and abilities. Indeed, identifying candidates for remedial training is a 
common basis for conducting performance appraisals (Grote, 1996). Moreover, workers also 
may come to ignore diagnostic information about their job performance that may improve their 
future performance. In this regard, reliance on comparative information as outlined by the proxy 
model may be regarded as a legitimate form of bias in the performance appraisal process (Ilgen 
& Feldman, 1983). 
It is important to note, however, that empirical demonstrations of the proxy model in 
organizations are lacking. Because the need to find and use relevant comparison standards is 
Preprint version 
Later published as Social comparison processes in organizations. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 102, 22-41. 
likely to be considerably greater on the job than in the laboratory conditions under which the 
proxy model was tested we need to be cautious about generalizing such effects. Future 
researchers need to consider the extent to which various contextual factors (e.g., the perceived 
importance of social comparison information) qualify predictions from the proxy model in 
organizations. Such efforts, we believe, will provide valuable insight into how workers use 
comparative information when assessing their own job performance. We are optimistic that the 
proxy model will prove be a useful conceptual base for launching such efforts. 
The Deflection Problem 
In the course of evaluating performance, workers are inclined to ask themselves “How 
well am I doing?” More often than not, answering requires posing another question: “Compared 
to what or to whom?” Frequently, this involves making invidious comparisons in which one is 
labeled as falling short of some standard (whether relative or objective in nature) against which 
comparisons are made. Moreover, as Moore (2007) makes clear, whether people make “worse 
than average” or “better than average” comparisons depends on the context and the nature of the 
comparison task. Because such information may challenge people’s self-images as competent 
employees it potentially threatens their self-identities (Morse & Gergen, 1970). 
Not surprisingly, this is likely to be problematic. As Kluger and DeNisi (1996) note in an 
influential review of the literature on performance feedback, such threats often result in lowered 
job performance. Eden’s (2003) research on the self-fulfilling prophecy suggests one underlying 
mechanism. If employees perceive themselves to be poor performers, their supervisors, in turn, 
will treat them as such (e.g., giving up on them by denying them needed resources or 
opportunities), thereby making their perceived poor performance a reality. This, of course, 
constitutes an inherent challenge to managers who deliver performance feedback insofar as the 
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sharing of negative comparative information is an inevitable part of the performance appraisal 
process. 
It is important to note that there are individual differences in people’s willingness to 
perform poorly in response to negative performance feedback (Greenberg, 1977), suggesting that 
not all employees are likely to demonstrate negative behavioral effects. Yet, simply because 
some individuals might not lower their performance in response to negative performance 
feedback, it is possible that other undesirable forms of behavior may result. Because being 
perceived as a good employee is important to most people, they may be threatened greatly by 
negative performance feedback, but prefer not to call attention to themselves by performing 
poorly. Indeed, as noted by Mussweiler, Gabriel, and Bodenhausen (2000), people are likely to 
engage in less effortful, primarily cognitive, ways of responding to identity threats. 
For example, instead of lowering performance, people may engage in deflection—that is, 
“actively reconstructing the meaning and relevance of the comparative context” (Mussweiler et 
al., 2000, p. 398). In other words, deflection helps protect people’s self images by shifting their 
identities in ways that make their ostensibly poor performances appear acceptable. This, of 
course, can have adverse organizational consequces insofar as it insulates employees from 
corrective influences that otherwise would improve sub-par performance. As a result, individuals 
engaging in deflection are denied one of the key benefits of the performance appraisal process. 
Employees engaging in deflection are likely to respond in ways that are more subtle and 
covert than merely lowering their job performance, making them difficult to discern. In general, 
because upward comparisons may be threatening to some individuals (particularly when the 
comparisons are being made to individuals with whom employees do not identify), it is here 
when deflection is most likely to occur. In other words, people may downplay cognitively the 
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differences between themselves and others who seemingly outperformed them. As Mussweiler et 
al. (2000) explain, such behavior is likely to take several forms. Among these are the following: 
 Perceiving oneself as more similar than warranted to high performing others 
(Schwartz & Smith, 1976), particularly when the dimension in question is important 
to one’s identity (Van Yperen, 1992). 
 Undermining the apparent superiority of another’s performance by lowering one’s 
own assessment of the work in question (Reis, Gerrard, & Gibbons, 1993). 
 Discounting the validity of one’s own inferior performance by negating the 
importance of the comparison standard (Tesser, 1988). 
 Redefining the comparison other as nondiagnostic of oneself because of his or her 
ostensibly great difference from oneself (Wood, 1989). 
Not only do all these forms of behavior occur, but they also are particularly likely among 
individuals who are high in self-esteem—that is, people whose identities are most heavily 
invested in their task performance. In reviewing research on this topic, Mussweiler et al. (2000) 
conclude, “In a nutshell, this body of evidence suggests that people high in self-esteem are 
generally more skilled at reconstructing threatening feedback in a self-protective way than are 
people low in self-esteem” (p. 400). 
Cast in terms of performance appraisal, all these forms of deflecting represent cognitive 
mechanisms through which people are able to subvert the presumably diagnostic performance 
information that otherwise would result by engaging in social comparison. Although deflection 
strategies have not yet been identified explicitly as operating in the context of performance 
appraisal, Feldman (1981, 1994; Ilgen & Feldman, 1983) already has chronicled that similar 
cognitive processes are responsible for biasing the performance appraisal process. Interestingly, 
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although social comparisons generally are assumed to be an inherent part of organizational 
performance appraisals, our analyses suggest that their role in this process is biasing as opposed 
to benign. 
Peer Evaluations 
Thus far, we have focused on social comparison processes as they might apply in 
traditional, top-down evaluation settings. These days, however, peer evaluations of performance 
are becoming increasingly commonplace as 360-degree performance appraisal practices (Beehr, 
Ivantskaya, Hansen, Erofeev, & Gudanowski, 2001) and self-managed teams (e.g., Erez, LePine, 
& Elms, 2005) grow in popularity. 
Using peers as referents. In analyzing the use of peer evaluations, Mumford (1983) has 
observed that “social comparison processes are likely to have a great deal of relevance to peer 
revaluations and their validity” (p. 875). Mumford’s (1983) arguments are quite reasonable. He 
begins by explaining that objective information about people’s own performance is likely to be 
available only infrequently, and that when it is available, it is inclined to be biased by 
nonperformance-related factors. As a result, workers are inclined to assess their own 
performance by making comparisons to peers. This, Mumford (1983) claims, is particularly 
likely to occur under novel conditions (e.g., when evaluating performance on a newly learned 
task) because existing performance standards are unlikely to exist under these conditions. 
Additionally, Mumford (1983) claims that because peers share similar backgrounds and 
perform similar tasks under similar conditions, they are likely to be especially attractive as 
referents. Of special importance to I/O psychologists, Mumford (1983) also argues that as 
employees gain experience comparing themselves to others performing work with which they are 
familiar, the validity of their resulting evaluations is likely to be enhanced. 
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Potential limitations in the contemporary workplace. Although these analyses are logical 
and follow from what social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954), and subsequent analyses (e.g., 
Kulik & Ambrose, 1992) suggest about basing social comparisons on similar others, we have 
several reasons to question them. Specifically, we believe that the processes outlined by 
Mumford are quite reasonable in the abstract, but in several ways are inconsistent with the 
realities of today’s workplace. 
First, as Mumford (1983) himself acknowledges, for employees’ performance 
observations to be valid, they must be based on ample opportunities to observe one’s peers. In 
1983, when Mumford’s article was published, it might have been reasonable to assume that 
workers would develop growing awareness of their peers’ work as they toiled with them 
shoulder-to-shoulder. Today, however, the advent of virtual work environments (see the 
following section) suggests that it no longer is safe to assume that people always get to observe 
their coworkers. 
Second, given today’s widespread use of cross-functional work teams (e.g., Keller, 
2001), it is quite possible that many of today’s employees are working alongside others whose 
work is so highly specialized that they are not in good positions to use them as bases for 
evaluating their own work, let alone assessing those individuals’ levels of performance. In other 
words, readily available comparisons may be considered non-diagnostic. 
Third, given the high degree of racial and ethnic diversity found in today’s workplaces 
(Martins, Milliken, Wiesenfeld, & Salgado, 2003), there’s no longer any good reason to assume 
that the degree of background similarity between people working side-by-side is at all alike. 
Even if people are doing the same work in the same place with their coworkers, there’s little 
reason to assume that they share similar background characteristics. And, absent the levels of 
Preprint version 
Later published as Social comparison processes in organizations. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 102, 22-41. 
background similarity that otherwise might invite people to compare themselves to one another, 
there is good reason to challenge the extent to which we can assume comparisons based on 
similarity. Indeed, in many communities, it’s probably safer to assume differences instead of 
similarities. 
Finally, we also have reason to question Mumford’s claim that as workers gain job 
experience their awareness of performance-relevant characteristics will develop— and along 
with it, the validity of peer evaluations. Although this appears reasonable, it ignores two key 
landmines along the road to validity. First, there is considerable evidence on well-known biases 
in performance appraisal systems (for a review, see Stauffer & Buckley, 2005). Rather than 
eliminating such biases, our discussion thus far suggests that the tendency to engage in social 
comparison also may promote such biases. Second, we also cannot ignore the very real 
possibility that certain reward practices (e.g., zero-sum reward systems) may discourage positive 
evaluations of peers (Lawler, 2003). Indeed, research has shown that self-serving motives to bias 
performance evaluations frequently threaten the validity of performance ratings (Greenberg, 
1991). 
It is important to note that we are not rejecting peer evaluations as valid sources of 
performance information. Indeed, we agree with Mumford (1983) that they stand to be 
potentially useful in providing comparative information with diagnostic value. However, it is 
important to acknowledge that various features of the contemporary workplace make it unlikely 
that such information always will be available—or, that it would be considered relevant if it 
were. In other words, the potential diagnostic value of comparative information from peers 
cannot be assumed in some modern workplaces. Among other reasons, this is because 
observational opportunities may be limited and the most readily available bases of comparison 
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are rejected for being non-diagnostic because of vast differences in job skills or ethnic identity. 
Under such conditions, workers may have valid reasons to challenge the validity of comparisons 
based on peer evaluations. 
Key Conclusions: Performance Evaluations 
We believe that social comparison processes play a key role in the performance 
evaluation process but that they do not always enhance the validity of the evaluation process. In 
top-down evaluations, comparative information may be rejected and/or ignored in keeping with 
the tendency to bias information in a self-serving manner. And, although peer evaluations 
promise to offer relevant comparative information for self-diagnostic purposes, various features 
of today’s workplaces limit the extent to which this promise stands to be fulfilled. In this regard, 
it would be useful for researchers to identify the particular contexts in which social comparison 
processes play especially pivotal roles in performance evaluations. Specifically, determining the 
conditions under which various deflection strategies are used would provide useful insight into 
the biasing of performance evaluations (Ilgen & Feldman, 1983).  
Virtual Work Environments 
Recent years have seen the emergence of virtual work environments—organizational 
settings in which employees work in physically distant locations (for a review, see Webster & 
Staples, 2006), capitalizing on opportunities provided by the use of advanced information and 
communication technology (Goodman & Wilson, 2002; Kasper-Fuehrer & Ashkanasy, 2001, 
2004). By “virtual work environments,” we are referring collectively to such phenomena as 
“virtual teams,” “virtual organizations,” and related workplace practices characterized by the use 
of advanced technology to overcome physical distance. Despite differences, we refer to these 
practices without distinction because all are bound by the characteristic of “virtualness.” 
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With influential observers arguing that virtual work environments are here to stay (e.g., 
Davidow & Malone, 1992; Goldman, Nagel, & Preiss, 1995), it’s little wonder that practicing 
managers (Hertel, Geister, & Udo, 2005; Hoeffling, 2003) and social scientists (e.g, Hardin, 
Fuller, & Valacich, 2006; Martins, Gilson, & Maynard, 2004) have paid considerable attention to 
the special qualities of such environments. Most germane to our analysis, Alexander (1997) has 
noted that the physical absence of coworkers “changes the interactions and relationships between 
the parties involved” (p. 135), which, as Conner (2003) has explained, brings with it unique 
challenges and opportunities for social comparison. Additionally, virtual work environments, 
unlike their traditional counterparts, frequently are reconfigured as conditions evolve (Goodman 
& Wilson, 2002). 
The basis for this is simple. Social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) tells us that 
people compare themselves with others to whom they are similar in ability, largely because 
doing so allows them to reduce uncertainty and to preserve or to enhance their self-esteem 
(Dakin & Arrowood, 1981). Traditionally, such comparisons are based on others who are present 
physically, not only because such individuals are convenient, but also because such individuals 
are likely to be similar in key ways. This is in keeping with Goodman’s (1974, 1977) 
acknowledgment of the importance of availability and relevance as determinants of referent 
choice. Not surprisingly, coworkers’ physical presence enhances their salience as referent others. 
In virtual work environments, however, such physical presence is missing insofar as individuals 
may be distributed across different organizations, cultures, and time zones. This raises questions 
about how employees come to select referent others under such conditions. The answer is 
important because employees’ responses to the situations they encounter are likely to be based 
on the referents used (Kulik & Ambrose, 1992). To date, Shepherd, Briggs, Reinig, Yen, and 
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Nunamaker (1996) are the only researchers to have studied social comparison effects in this 
context. In a laboratory study of electronic brainstorming, they found that an on-screen display 
revealing that others are generating more and better ideas decreased social loafing, thereby 
leading to more creative ideas. Clearly, more research of this type, particularly direct 
comparisons between comparative information from in-person and virtual others, is called for.  
Conner’s Propositions 
In her comparative analysis of workers’ reliance on referent others in environments in 
which coworkers are co-located (i.e., in traditional environments) as opposed to when they are 
distant (i.e., in virtual environments), Conner (2003) proposes several key differences. Her 
analyses are predicated on the idea that virtual environments deny employees some comparative 
information that otherwise might be available to those in traditional work environments. Given 
people’s fundamental desires to compare themselves to others (Festinger, 1954), coupled with 
the paucity of comparative information available to people in virtual environments (e.g. 
Cramton, 2001), they are likely to rely on other, non-local, referents. These include, for example, 
other people doing the same jobs in other organizations and oneself at earlier points in time. 
Although making such comparisons requires some effort, the absence of readily available 
referents is likely to motivate such behavior. 
In analogous fashion, Conner (2003) also claims that people working in virtual 
environments sometimes have to rely on comparative information considered less than ideal 
because it is based on dissimilar others (Cramton, 2001, refers to this lack of shared context and 
information as the “mutual knowledge problem”). Specifically, although social comparison 
theory (Festinger, 1954) claims that people prefer making comparisons to similar others, this is 
not always possible in virtual work environments. Under such conditions, people resort to 
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comparing themselves to others who are very different (e.g., Gartrell, 1982; Strauss, 1968). This 
is in keeping with Kulik and Ambrose’s (1992) claim that when it comes to comparing oneself to 
others, “availability may override the relevance of available alternatives” (p. 229). In the case of 
virtual environments, in which it is difficult to locate others against whom to compare oneself, 
workers may be inclined to select as a comparison standard even a very different other than no 
one at all. We concur with Connor’s claim that this is not necessarily bad. For example, 
conditions requiring people to compare themselves to others with whom they ordinarily would 
not make such comparisons may open the door to new learning opportunities created by 
exchanging ideas between individuals who otherwise might have refrained from communicating 
(Constant, Sproull, & Kiesler, 1996). 
Finally, Conner (2003) asserts that the absence of readily available comparative 
information to employees in virtual environments denies them the opportunities to reduce 
personal uncertainty that normally are provided by making local comparisons. Compensating for 
this, such individuals are inclined to engage in more creative efforts to reduce uncertainty than 
those working in traditional environments. This may take such forms as making frequent phone 
calls to colleagues in other organizations (even if they do different work), visiting Internet 
message boards and chat rooms, and the like. Connor’s (2003) logic is straightforward: 
(1) uncertainty about work-related topics runs high among employees in virtual environments 
(e.g., Tangirala & Alge, in press), and (2) people find uncertainty to be an undesirable state (e.g., 
Lind & Van den Bos, 2002), so (3) people working in virtual environments will be inclined to be 
highly proactive in their information-gathering (i.e., uncertainty-reduction) efforts. By contrast, 
because employees in traditional environments are likely to have more information available to 
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them, they are unlikely to encounter as much uncertainty, making them less inclined to engage in 
such effortful behaviors. 
Some Caveats 
The underling assumption that virtual employees are disadvantaged because of their 
limited access to referent information, as noted here, requires three key qualifications. First, 
although people working in distant locations may have to engage in more effort than their 
counterparts in traditional environments, it still is possible for them to be “kept in the loop” 
about referent information quite simply, such as by telephone and e-mail. Although this may 
require being more proactive than simply gathering information in a casual conversation with a 
colleague in an adjacent cubicle, we suspect that the strength of the underlying motive to seek-
out similar others would motivate such efforts—especially given that this may be accomplished 
readily. 
Taking this into account, it is possible that any disadvantages with respect to access to 
comparative information that may stem from working in virtual environments may be tempered 
by alternative means of accessing the same information. For example, some of the interpersonal-
based disadvantages of virtual environments are mitigated by focused efforts to help members of 
virtual groups understand the work of others (i.e., “keeping one another in the loop”; Weisband, 
1999) and by carefully communicating status differences between virtual team members that 
otherwise would be difficult to detect (Weisband, Schneider, & Connolly, 1995). (This is in 
keeping the difficulties people have differentiating status in some virtual environments; Driskell, 
Radtke, & Salas, 2003.) 
Second, it would be misleading to imply that all jobs may be classified as being either 
distinctly virtual or distinctly traditional in nature. Indeed, in today’s work environment, many 
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jobs have both virtual and traditional components—or, as Crandall and Wallace (1997, p. 29) 
referred to it, “degrees of virtualness” (see also, Griffith & Neale, 2001; Griffith, Sawyer, & 
Neale, 2003). For example, whereas some employees may spend some of their time 
telecommuting, they also may be required to be physically present in their offices at other times 
(Kurland & Egan, 1999). As a result, it’s possible that people may be denied ready access to 
comparative information on some occasions, but not others. And, whenever such information is 
available, people may be especially proactive in taking it in, getting it while they can. 
Unfortunately, evidence bearing on how people make social comparisons in virtual work 
environments has been extremely limited (e.g., Shepherd et al., 1996). This void is in keeping 
with Goodman and Wilson’s (2002) observation that organizational researchers still are 
struggling to move beyond the assumption implicit in traditional organizations that boundaries 
and information sources are relatively stable. Yet, scholarly work on virtual work environments 
now is beginning to emerge (e.g., Kasper-Fuehrer & Ashkanasy, 2001, 2004; for a review, see, 
Martins, Gilson, & Maynard, 2004). We encourage researchers to focus on such efforts insofar as 
they promise to provide considerable insight into both the nature of social comparison processes 
(because of the unique contextual variables examined) and virtual environments themselves 
(because of the knowledge likely to be provided about the process underlying its effects). 
Key Conclusions: Virtual Work Environments 
When workers are physically distant, as in virtual work environments, special challenges 
emerge as people endeavor to compare themselves to others. The limited availability of local 
comparisons leads workers to compare themselves to others who provide less-than-ideal sources 
of relevant comparative information, such as those who are dissimilar along key dimensions 
(e.g., people working in other organizations, or who do highly different work). We note, 
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however, that people in virtual environments may attempt to overcome such limitations by being 
highly proactive in their efforts to collect information in alternative ways (e.g., by posing 
questions in e-mails or phone calls). Although this requires extra effort, it makes it possible for 
workers in virtual environments to gather comparative information that otherwise might have 
been available to them in more passive fashion had they worked in traditional settings in which 
comparison others are co-located. Such effort enables workers in virtual environments to remain 
“in the loop,” thereby overcoming the limitation imposed by environmental conditions.  
However, empirical research identifying social comparison effects in such settings has yet to be 
conducted (see Hertel et al., 2005).  
Affective Workplace Behavior 
According to a Chinese proverb, “It is comparison that makes people miserable.” With all 
due respect to ancient wisdom, however, social psychological research (for overviews, see 
Smith, 2000; Buunk & Gibbons, 2007) suggests that this observation paints an unduly 
pessimistic picture of affective responses to social comparison. Indeed, modern scientific 
wisdom is more highly nuanced (Moore, 2007). And because the workplace offers a wealth of 
comparison opportunities, reactions to which promise to affect both individual and 
organizational well-being, organizational scientists find such matters to be of great interest 
(Ashkanasy, Härtel, & Zerbe, 2005). 
Contrast and Assimilation Effects 
One well established finding from this literature is that a contrast effect occurs in which 
individuals generally experience positive affect when making downward comparisons and 
negative affect when making upward comparisons (Mussweiler & Strack, 2000; see also Moore, 
2007). Simply put, comparing oneself to others who are better off prompts an unfavorable self-
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image, whereas comparing oneself to those who are worse off enhances one’s self-image. 
Lyubomirsky and Ross (1997) refer to this as the “hedonic consequences of social comparison” 
(p. 1141). This effect is so robust, in fact, that it occurs independently of one’s relationship with 
the target other or the nature of the comparison (Wheeler & Miyake, 1992). 
Alternatively, Wheeler (1966) suggested that under certain conditions people attempt to 
reaffirm their self-esteem by engaging in upward comparisons. Buunk, Zurriaga, Peiró, Nauta, 
and Gosalvez (2005) refer to this as the assimilation effect—the process in which individuals 
seek to establish their similarity to a comparison other believed to be better off (e.g., Collins, 
1995), despite the negative emotions (e.g., pity or shame) that result from making such 
comparisons. Research has found this effect in organizational settings (e.g., Buunk, Van der Zee, 
& Van Yperen, 2001; Buunk et al., 2005), albeit with situational and individual moderators. For 
example, Buunk, Ybema, Van der Zee, Schaufeli, & Gibbons (2001) found that nurses who 
compared themselves to higher-ranking colleagues suffered lower levels of personal 
accomplishment than those who compared themselves to lower-ranking individuals. 
Furthermore, these negative reactions were less pronounced among individuals who were highly 
predisposed to make social comparisons (Buunk, Van der Zee et al., 2001; Buunk et al., 2005). 
Considering that social comparisons have long-term consequences for people (e.g., 
beliefs in one’s self-efficacy) and that these are likely to be salient to employees, we believe that 
both the assimilation and contrast effects are likely to be encountered in many organizational 
situations. And, to the extent that this occurs, the effects of social comparison on various forms 
of organizational behavior appear to be more profound than acknowledged to date. As such, we 
join Moore (2007) in encouraging researchers to incorporate such  effects in future studies of 
social comparison. 
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Self-conscious Emotions and Social Emotions 
Another line of research on affect and social comparison focuses on self-conscious 
emotions—shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride (Tangney & Fischer, 1995)—so called 
because they reside internally within people (Tracy & Robins, 2004). Baldwin and Baccus 
(2004) argue that self-conscious emotions almost always are the result of social comparisons, 
often generated though automatic processes of cognitive appraisal, and inevitably in response to 
“real, anticipated, or remembered encounters with others” (Leary, Koch, & Hechenbleikner, 
2001, p. 146). Buck, Nakamura, Vieira, & Polonsky (2004) go a step further by elaborating a 
model of “higher level social emotions” that include pride, guilt, arrogance, shame, envy, pity, 
jealousy, and scorn. Specifically, they propose that pride, guilt, arrogance, and shame are 
experienced in reaction to one’s own success or failure in achieving expectations, whereas envy, 
pity, jealousy, and scorn arise in reaction to the achievements of others. 
As in the case of self-conscious emotions, social emotions, emotions that are external to 
people, also are derived from social comparisons. An employee may feel arrogant, for example, 
because she considers herself to be superior to others. Another may feel envious of a colleague 
who has taken a prestigious work assignment. To date, however, there have been only a few 
studies of social emotions in the workplace. In one such investigation, Poulson (2000) focused 
on shame. Based on Lewis’s (1992) definition of shame as an emotional reaction to the violation 
of standards, a failure to meet expectations, or a personal deficiency perceived to be permanent, 
Poulson (2000) argued that shame involves a cognitive evaluation of oneself in relation to others. 
This, in turn, triggers either repression or rage (Nathanson, 1992). Poulson (2000) suggests 
further that shame in the workplace is the result of faulty management practices, unrealistic 
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performance expectations, and discrimination, and that it leads to various counterproductive 
behaviors, such as withdrawal and aggression. 
Vecchio (1995, 2000, 2005) has studied two particular social emotions in the 
workplace—envy and jealousy. He defines jealousy among employees as a set of attitudes and 
behaviors resulting from “an employee’s loss of self-esteem and/or loss of outcomes associated 
with a working relationship” (Vecchio, 2000, p. 162) and envy as a set of attitudes and behaviors 
resulting from “an employee’s loss of self-esteem loss of self-esteem in response to a reference 
other’s obtainment of outcomes one strongly desires” (Vecchio, 2000, p. 162). Both definitions 
are couched in terms of social comparison processes. We see this, for example, in Vecchio’s 
(2000) study of the relationships between leaders and members of their groups. Specifically, 
employees experiencing jealousy and envy (resulting from receipt of relatively lower outcomes) 
suffered reduced levels of job-related self-esteem and control. These, in turn, resulted in various 
forms of employee withdrawal and aggressive behavior. More recently, Vecchio (2005) 
examined envy among employees from the perspective of the envied as well as the envious. 
Overall, he found that the envied experienced less negative emotion than the envious. 
Given the demonstrated importance of social emotions in the workplace, we believe that 
further theoretical refinement and empirical research in this field would be a wise investment. In 
this connection, we note that Weiss and Cropanzano’s (1996) affective events theory (AET) 
holds particular promise (for a review, see Weiss and Beal, 2005). This conceptualization asserts 
that personal events occurring in the workplace trigger emotional reactions that, in turn, 
determine various attitudinal and behavioral reactions. Although AET is framed in terms of the 
traditional dimensions of emotion (i.e., valence and intensity; see Watson & Tellegen, 1985), we 
believe that it is applicable as well to the social emotions in the workplace we have been 
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describing. In particular, the affective reactions to social comparisons that we have outlined 
above serve as exemplars of mechanisms underlying AET given that events (upward or 
downward social comparisons) generate emotional reactions that then have attitudinal and 
behavioral consequences. 
In closing, a brief methodological note is in order. To study the rapidly-changing nature 
of affective reactions necessitates using special research techniques that capture this dynamic 
phenomenon. In this respect, experience sampling methods (Larson & Csikszentmihalyi, 1983), 
in which respondents record their cognitive and affective reactions to events in real time, appear 
to hold special promise. Recording such responses using handheld computers (e.g., a Palm Pilot) 
already have proven especially useful in this regard (Yip, 2005). Another promising new 
approach is the day reconstruction method (Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, & Stone, 
2004), in which respondents are asked to relive the day in which a critical experience occurred, 
and to record their experiences and feelings in a minute-by-minute diary. Stone et al. (2006) have 
shown that this method can be used effectively to capture dynamic emotional fluctuations that 
individuals experience in their everyday lives. 
Key Conclusions: Affective Behavior 
Affective behavior is related closely to the social comparisons people make. Not only do 
people experience positive emotions when making downward comparisons, but they also 
experience negative emotions when making upward comparisons. Furthermore, both the self-
conscious emotions and the social emotions that people experience also stem from the social 
comparisons they make. We see this, for example, in the cases of jealousy and envy, in which 
emotional reactions (and concomitant behavioral reactions) follow from workers’ comparisons of 
desired outcomes relative to those of their coworkers. Although it hasn’t yet been used to 
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examine social comparison processes, we believe that affective response theory (Weiss & 
Cropanzano, 1996) holds particular promise for studying the affective reactions associated with 
making various social comparisons. In conducting such work, new research tools, such as 
experience sampling and day reconstruction are likely to prove especially useful.  
Stress 
Generally defined, stress refers to people’s emotional and physiological experiences 
resulting from perceived threats to their well-being (Lazarus, 1999). Often, such threats are based 
on people’s assessments that the demands of a situation they face exceed the personal resources 
they have available to meet them (Folkman & Lazarus, 1988). This would be the case, for 
example, if an employee were to perceive himself as unable to meet an impending deadline 
because his skill level did not allow him to work sufficiently fast. Social comparison processes 
enter into this process insofar as they contribute to people’s perceptions of the resources 
available to them and their self-efficacy (Bègue, 2005). Thus, to the extent that the individual in 
this example perceives that his skills are adequate to meet the demand (i.e., he can work fast 
enough to meet the deadline), then stress would not be experienced. 
Assessment of Available Resources 
The extent to which social comparisons are involved in this process is likely to depend on 
the degree to which the assessment of resources can occur objectively—that is, in the absence of 
comparative information. This would be the case, for example, when the resource in question is 
objective in nature, such as when assessing the availability of time or money to accomplish a 
goal. However, comparative information is likely to be particularly important in the case of other 
resources, for which assessment is fundamentally comparative in nature. For example, people 
generally cannot determine how creative they are or how interpersonally skilled they are until 
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they compare themselves to others. Indeed, it is not unusual for people to rely on others with 
whom they work as standards of reference against which they compare the degree to which they 
bring valued resources to their jobs (Suls, Martin, & Wheeler, 2002). 
Research shows that this occurs in a particular manner. In general, comparing oneself to 
another who is more capable (i.e., making an upward comparison) reduces one’s senses of 
personal accomplishment and self-efficacy (Maslach, 1993), whereas comparing oneself to a less 
capable other (i.e., making a downward comparison) inflates one’s senses of control and 
capability (Hakmiller, 1966, 1981). Based on this, we may expect that making an upward 
comparison is likely to be stress-inducing. 
Role of identification. Importantly, however, these effects are likely to occur only to the 
extent that the person in question does not identify with the comparison other. Indeed, as several 
researchers have demonstrated, the negative effects of upward comparisons and the positive 
effects of downward comparisons depend on the degree to which one identifies with the 
comparison other and his or her associates (Buunk, 1994; Buunk, Collins, Taylor, Van Yperen, 
& Dakoff, 1990; Tesser, 1988; Ybema & Buunk, 1995). Specifically, when individuals who 
evaluate their resources relative to those with whom they identify perceive that they are similar 
to those others, the upward comparison to that target will inflate—and, with it, perception of 
one’s capabilities (Van der Zee, Buunk, & Sanderman, 1990; Ybema & Buunk, 1995). 
This is in keeping with evidence showing that people intentionally compare themselves 
with superior others so as to enjoy the opportunity to relate to them, promoting beliefs in their 
own superiority (Collins, 2000). Thus, comparing oneself upward with an individual with whom 
we identify is likely to raise one’s confidence in the capacity to marshal resources required to 
meet the demands of the environment. As a result, stress levels are likely to be attenuated. By 
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contrast, people making downward comparisons with those with whom they identify are likely to 
feel less qualified to face environmental demands, thereby elevating their stress levels. 
Caveat: Dynamic Nature of Evaluations 
Before concluding this point, it is important to note that this rationale is based solely on 
initial evaluations of stressors in the environment. However, the dynamic nature of stress 
evaluations described by Lazarus (1999) suggests that the bases for evaluations are likely to 
change, and with them, experiences of stress. In fact, it may be said that if people making 
upward comparisons with similar others come to perceive their capacities to deal with 
environmental demands in unrealistically inflated terms, their overconfidence may lead them to 
make decisions whose results may be quite stressful. This would be the case, for example, if a 
protégé believes that he or she is capable of performing a task as well as his or her mentor. By 
the same token, whereas individuals who under-evaluate their capacities to deal with 
environmental demands (because of downward comparisons with similar others) may experience 
stress at first (as they perceive situations to be more threatening than they really are), it’s 
possible that over time, they will come to realize that they are better equipped than earlier 
envisioned, thereby lowering their stress levels. In sum, the potentially stress-relieving or stress-
inducing effects of engaging in social comparisons are likely to be only temporary in nature. Yet, 
insofar as the effects of most stressors are likely to be temporally-limited in nature (Peterson, 
1999), social comparisons as sources of stress cannot be dismissed on this basis. 
Key Conclusions: Stress 
Social comparison processes are involved with stress in a cognitive capacity. 
Comparisons with others help people assess the extent to which they have the resources 
necessary to perform a task. And this, in turn, is a primary step in the assessment of stress 
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(Folkman & Lazarus, 1988). Of course, the resulting assessment is likely to be determined on the 
selection of a comparison standard, which itself is based on identification with various 
comparison others. We note, however, that the continuous nature of the process of evaluating 
potential stressors requires acknowledging the highly dynamic nature of this process. As in the 
case of measuring affective events, research tapping the effects of various stressors also stands to 
benefit from the use of research tools such as experience sampling and day reconstruction, that 
capture people’s experiences on a real-time basis,  
Leadership 
Leadership has been depicted as a process of social interaction in which leaders attempt 
to influence the behavior of followers (Yukl & Van Fleet, 1992). From followers’ perspectives, 
leaders attempt to promote impressions of themselves as being charismatic (Weierter, 1997), 
striving to be seen as superior in the eyes of their followers. Moreover, followers are likely to be 
influenced by upward social comparisons with their leaders (Wood, 1989), thereby making such 
comparisons salient. This is particularly so in Western cultures, which are characterized by low 
power distance in hierarchical relationships (Hofstede, 2001; Carl, Gupta, & Javidan, 2004). 
Further, given that leaders occupy higher status positions in organizations and that highly 
ambitious people make upward comparisons (Wheeler, 1966), it is reasonable to conclude that 
ambitious followers compare themselves to leaders and emulate them so as to become leaders 
themselves. In the case of employees, organizational leaders are indeed likely to be highly salient 
as bases of social comparison (Messé & Watts, 1983; Diener, 1984). Despite these connections, 
an explicit conceptual link between social comparison processes and leadership has yet to 
emerge. Two particular theories of leadership, however—leader-member exchange (LMX) 
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theory (for a review, see Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995) and the social identity theory (SIT) of 
leadership (Hogg, 2001)—hold special promise for developing this connection. 
Leader-Member Exchange (LMX) Theory 
LMX theory posits that leaders relate to their followers differently depending on the level 
of trust developed with each individual. As such, it is inappropriate to regard groups as 
homogeneous entities, but rather as a set of differentiated individual relationships between 
leaders and followers (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995). Using this framework, Scandura (1999) has 
argued that a leader’s trust in and commitment to low LMX subordinates (i.e., individuals who 
are not favored by their leaders) is lower than it is for high LMX subordinates (i.e., individuals 
who are favored by their leaders). 
This has interesting implications for social comparison processes. Specifically, it would 
appear that social comparisons are more likely to occur in high LMX relationships than in low 
LMX relationships. Specifically, subordinates in high LMX relationships may be expected to be 
more likely to make upward social comparisons and to have aspirations to become leaders 
themselves than those in low LMX relationships. This proposition has not been tested, however. 
Yet, the prospects for understanding LMX relationships in terms of social comparison processes 
make this an area worthy of future research and theory development. 
Social Identity Theory 
An alternative perspective on the role of social comparison and leadership is offered by 
Hogg’s (2001; Van Knippenberg & Hogg, 2003) social identity theory (SIT) of leadership. 
Whereas LMX focuses on relationships been leaders and members, SIT asserts that leaders 
embody members’ identities as a group. Thus, a leader is likely to be the most “prototypical” 
member of a group. Like LMX theory, however, SIT theory also stipulates that members 
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experience special affinity for a leader who is perceived to be similar to them in terms of ideals 
and personal attributes. For this to occur, however, there must be higher levels of trust and 
commitment among group members who share their leaders’ ideas of their groups’ identities 
than among those who do not share these views. 
In effect, SIT implies that a group member’s sense of esteem and identity is determined 
in part by his or her social comparisons to the group’s leader (see also Lord & Brown, 2004). 
Van Knippenberg, Van Knippenberg, De Cremer, and Hogg (2004) refer to this as “follower 
self-conception” (p. 825). Although these authors do not mention social comparison theory 
explicitly, it is implicit throughout SIT because the followers’ self conception always is framed 
in terms of the group’s identity, which in turn, is embodied in the leader. In other words, group 
members engage in a continuous process of social comparison with their leader as a means of 
maintaining their groups’ identities, and ultimately, to establish their own self-identities within 
and between groups. 
Key Conclusions: Leadership 
Although social comparison processes as of yet have not been applied to studies of 
leadership, there is value in acknowledging the processes of social comparison inherent in both 
the LMX and SIT theories of leadership. Specifically, social comparisons serve to define both 
group members’ relationships with their leaders as well as members’ own senses of self-identity 
and group-identity. As such, understanding of social comparison processes has the potential to 
promote understanding of the fundamental interpersonal processes on which organizational 
leadership is based. Indeed, future researchers would do well to develop this potential. 
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Social Comparison Processes in Organizations: Is Anything Unique? 
Wood (1996) has noted that social comparison consists of several sub-processes, with 
most attention paid to two particular ones—acquiring social information and thinking about that 
information. It is within these, we believe, that the unique nature of social comparison processes 
in organizations becomes apparent (see also Goodman & Haisley, 2007). 
Acquiring Social Information in Organizations 
With respect to the acquisition of social information, the making of social comparisons is 
considered by most to be a deliberate act (Wood, 1989). In other words, it is assumed that that 
people intentionally select the other individuals against whom they compare themselves. Wood 
(1996) notes that most social psychological research adopts this tradition, and the same can be 
said, we believe, about much of the organizational research summarized here. In equity theory 
(Adams, 1965), for example, the selection of a comparison standard has been treated in the 
literature as a deliberate choice (Adams & Freedman, 1976). In fact, a case could be made for 
recasting the referents summarized in Table 1 as simply a menu of options as workers ponder the 
question, “To whom shall I compare myself in this situation?” In similar fashion, our analyses of 
virtual work environments suggests that people whose working conditions result in having 
certain (presumably more desirable) comparison options taken from them engage in 
compensatory efforts to obtain the information they otherwise would have received in a 
traditional work setting. Here too, the choice of comparison referents is assumed to be deliberate. 
An alternative possibility is that people encounter social information passively instead of 
searching for it actively. Indeed, everyday life provides many opportunities for people to 
experience comparative social information by happenstance (Wheeler & Miyake, 1992). The 
same thing also may occur in the workplace. For example, a worker may make casual notice of 
Preprint version 
Later published as Social comparison processes in organizations. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 102, 22-41. 
the fact that a colleague is putting in longer hours at the office. When people stumble upon social 
information, Wood (1996) argues, they automatically compare themselves to the individuals 
involved. Indeed, research confirms that people make social comparisons fairly spontaneously, in 
relatively effortless fashion (Gilbert, Giesler, & Morris, 1995). 
Elaborating the distinction between deliberate efforts to acquire comparison information 
and the casual encountering of such information, we believe that studies of social comparison in 
the workplace highlight a third alternative. Specifically, social comparisons made in 
organizations sometimes are the direct byproducts of formally imposed procedures. For example, 
the introduction of a particular pay policy, performance appraisal system, or virtual work process 
brings with it opportunities to acquire relevant forms of social information (e.g., whether one is 
paid higher or lower than comparable others). Associated with these practices are changes that 
impose social comparisons on workers. 
Some have argued that encounters cannot force social comparison insofar as it is always 
up to individuals themselves as to whether or not they wish to think about comparative 
information (Brickman & Bulman, 1977). Although this may be so at an abstract level, we 
believe that the salience of certain externally imposed conditions (e.g., changes in leadership, 
pay policies, and/or appraisal systems) may drive certain social comparisons. Put differently, 
although casual encounters with comparison opportunities may be ignored when it comes to 
thinking about social information (e.g., comparing oneself to a more intelligent or attractive 
individual casually encountered in a public place; Goethals’s, 1986), workers do not have this 
luxury when encounters with others are imposed upon them in the workplace. Indeed, by design, 
many organizational processes are intended to impose new sets of comparative standards, 
making their application difficult, if not impossible, to ignore. For example, in the course of 
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completing a 360-degree appraisal form managers are likely to be required to compare 
themselves with others doing similar work (Beehr et al., 2001; Brett & Atwater, 2001). Likewise, 
the introduction of a team-based pay system brings with it a set of new rules about relevant 
referent comparisons (Balkin & Montemayor, 2000). 
With this in mind, we believe that organizational settings provide valuable opportunities 
to study social comparison processes insofar as the manner in which some comparative 
information is made available to people is unique in its deliberateness, presence, and salience. 
The matter of how people assess such information, and the possibility that they respond to such 
cognitions differently promises to be worthy of future research consideration. 
Thinking About Social Information in Organizations 
After people acquire social information, Wood (1996) explains that the stage is set for 
them to think about it. One form this may take involves assessing one’s standing relative to 
another with respect to some attribute. In some social situations such judgments are made 
casually and with only limited regard for the consequences. This would be the case, for example, 
if while purchasing an inexpensive used car Man A observes another person at the same time, 
Man B, purchasing a more expensive, new, top-of-the-line new vehicle off the showroom floor. 
This may reinforce Man A’s self-beliefs that others are wealthier, but it may have little bearing 
on his self-image because Man A already is likely to know his relative standing with respect to 
the dimension of wealth. Also, wealth may not be given much weight in the formation of his 
self-image. 
Although similarly unremarkable social comparisons surely are made all the time in the 
workplace, it also is possible that certain qualities of the workplace make assessments of relative 
standing of considerable interest. Consider, for example, employees seeking answers to such 
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questions as, “How do I stand compared to the job performance of others?” or “Do I have a 
chance at promotion relative to my colleague?” Answers may be sought as responses to explicit 
inquiries to supervisors or they may be based on covert and implicit (but equally deliberate), 
observations of the workplace. Clearly, these different forms may bring different answers, and on 
its own the question of which of these two forms of information-seeking is likely to be used is a 
very an interesting one. In either case, however, the comparative information analyzed is likely 
to be carefully evaluated in view of the answers’ consequences for employees self-images and 
their continued employment. 
Interestingly, formal practices such as employee development exercises and performance 
appraisal interviews frequently are designed to make the answers explicit and to convince 
employees of their veracity. Thus, the “selling” of comparative social information in the 
workplace is, in some ways, an institutionalized process. Given the well-accepted finding from 
the literature on attitude change that people better accept information they believe they came to 
on their own than information presented to them for purposes of convincing them about 
something (Petty & Wegener, 1998), it is tempting to consider the possibility that the processing 
of comparative information in organizations also differs as a function of the manner in which 
that information is sought and presented. In fact, the possibility that comparative information 
presented to employees is rejected on the grounds that its validity is questionable or that the 
motives for presenting that information are suspiciously manipulative in intent may be a possible 
explanation for the rejection of organizational practices that sometimes challenges the efficacy of 
practicing managers (Allcorn, Baum, Diamond, & Stein, 1996). 
Finally, we should note another way in which studying social comparisons in 
organizations opens our eyes to previously unacknowledged complexities with respect to 
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thinking about social information. One of the central tenets of social comparison theory 
(Festinger, 1954) is that people compare themselves to similar others. Although the nature of 
such dimensions of similarity has been debated (Mussweiler, 2003; Wood, 1989), it is not until 
one considers the virtual work environment that the real possibility comes forth that finding 
seemingly “similar others” as referents sometimes may be very difficult, if not impossible. 
Consider, for example, that some virtual environments (virtual organizations, in particular) 
consist of large teams of individuals who work in many different organizations scattered 
throughout the world (Webster & Staples, 2006). Judging the similarity of such individuals in 
such conditions may be so challenging that workers motivated to find similar others may find it 
necessary to assume its existence by stretching the facts. That is, they may construct social 
information (a reality of social comparison processes noted by Wood, 1996) as they struggle to 
meet the fundamental need to compare themselves to others. And given the difficulty of 
detecting objective information to the contrary, it’s possible that their assumed similar 
comparison others are, in reality, quite different. 
Some may be tempted to say that this doesn’t matter because people’s cognitions are 
based on their perceptions, regardless of their veracity. Although this may be true, we also 
cannot deny the possibility that the tenuous nature of the process of selecting comparison others 
is likely to lead workers to take into account the merits of various individuals as prospective 
bases of comparison. And, because socially constructed bases of similarity may collapse as 
conveniently as they are formed, the reliability of faceless individuals located half-way around 
the world as comparison referents surely must be called into question. Of course, the extent to 
which this occurs is an empirical question—and one well worth examining. If nothing else, the 
Preprint version 
Later published as Social comparison processes in organizations. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 102, 22-41. 
fact that it points to key questions about a fundamental quality of the social comparison process 
further underscores the wisdom of studying such processes in organizations. 
Key Conclusions: Unique Benefits of Studying Social Comparison Processes in Organizations 
This section is headed by the question as to whether or not studying social comparison 
processes in organizations has any unique merit. Our answer is unequivocally “yes.” Although 
organizations, as a context, provide opportunities to confirm what already is known about social 
comparison processes, potent contextual variables also lead to unique insight and raise 
fundamental questions about social comparison that beg to be addressed. Thus, when it comes to 
studying social comparison, organizations constitute a setting that cannot be dismissed on the 
grounds that they constitute “business as usual.” Indeed, studying social comparison in 
businesses is not the usual business.  
Conclusion 
We have analyzed social comparison processes in six key organizational contexts: 
(1) organizational justice, (2) performance appraisal, (3) virtual work environments, (4) affective 
behavior in the workplace, (5) stress, and (6) leadership. In each of these areas, we have offered 
a set of key conclusions and recommendations for future research. Specifically, we have 
emphasized the important roles played by social comparison information in these contexts. 
Notably, we asked how comparison information is acquired and how individuals think about and 
use this information once acquired. In so doing, we believe we made a strong case for studying 
social comparison processes in organizations—a focus that is still relatively infrequent despite its 
benefits to understanding organizations and social comparison processes themselves.  
Our assertion that fully understanding human behavior in the workplace requires 
appreciating social comparison processes is far from hyperbole. To the contrary, it is axiomatic 
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to say that people working with others find it almost impossible not to compare themselves to 
them. As referents, coworkers are more than convenient, they are compelling sources of social 
information (Kulik & Ambrose, 1992), and, as we have noted, workplace dynamics often impose 
opportunities to attend to that information. Based on this, we have argued that understanding the 
dynamics underlying such comparisons is worthwhile. Indeed, our analyses offer insight into 
popular organizational practices (e.g., performance appraisal, the introduction of virtual work 
environments) as well as fundamental psychological processes in organizations (e.g., perceiving 
fairness and experiencing affect). Although the role of social comparison processes sometimes is 
merely implicit in the study of these matters, researchers and theorists have acknowledged its 
value. However, in the case of some aspects of topics of keen interest to organizational scholars 
(e.g., leadership), attention to social comparison processes largely has gone unacknowledged. 
Yet, as we have noted, social comparison processes appear to be inextricably involved in these 
areas as well, warranting exploration in future studies. 
We believe that organizations constitute a valuable context within which to study social 
comparison processes. Not only are social comparisons endemic to work settings, but if there is 
any merit to our analyses, such comparisons manifest themselves in ways that sometimes are 
broader in scope and more highly nuanced than has been recognized to date in the literature. And 
given the importance of understanding social comparison processes (as spotlighted by the many 
provocative contributions to this issue), we hope that our analyses will stimulate interest in 
examining them in organizations. 
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